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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 1718, Robert Maynard sailed into Hampton Roads, Virginia with the 
severed head of Captain Edward Teach, better known as the legendary 
Blackbeard, proudly displayed on the bowsprit of his vessel.1  Almost three 
hundred years later, six suspected Somali pirates stood for trial in a U.S. 
district court in Norfolk, Virginia, not far from Hampton Roads.2  The USS 
Ashland found the suspects on April 10, 2010, floating in a small boat in the 
Gulf of Aden with AK-47 style firearms, apparently lying in wait for passing 
ships.3  Though these men were clearly not fishing,4 the judge dropped the 
piracy charges on August 17, 2010, finding that “the Government . . . failed 
to establish that any unauthorized acts of violence or aggression committed 
on the high seas constitutes piracy” under U.S. or international law.5  On one 
hand, the due process enjoyed by these suspected pirates illustrates the 
advancements made in criminal justice since the days of Blackbeard.6  On 
the other hand, the case underscores one of the greatest challenges faced in 
the fight against modern maritime piracy—how to effectively and fairly 
prosecute a Somali pirate.7 
With the recent resurgence in piratical activities off the eastern coast of 
Africa,8 finding an answer to this question remains crucial.  Despite 
heightened attention from the international community, efforts to quell the 
                                                                                                                   
 1 Keith Johnson, Who’s a Pirate? In Court, A Duel Over Definitions, WALL ST. J., Aug. 
20, 2010, at W1. 
 2 United States v. Said, 757 F. Supp. 2d 554, 556 (E.D. Va. 2010), vacated, 680 F.3d 374 
(4th Cir. 2012) (granting defendants’ motion to dismiss the charges of piracy). 
 3 Id. at 556–57. 
 4 Douglas Guilfoyle, Prosecuting Pirates in National Courts: US v Said and Piracy Under 
US Law, EJIL: TALK! (Aug 23, 2010), http://www.ejiltalk.org/prosecuting-pirates-in-national-
courts-us-v-said-and-piracy-under-us-law/ (criticizing the district court’s ruling in Said). 
 5 Said, 757 F. Supp. 2d at 567. 
 6 Eugene Kontorovich, “A Guantánamo on the Sea”: The Difficulty of Prosecuting Pirates 
and Terrorists, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 243, 256–57 (2010). 
 7 See id. at 256–74 (explaining the difficulties of effectively prosecuting pirates); James 
Thuo Gathii, The Use of Force, Freedom of Commerce, and Double Standards in Prosecuting 
Pirates in Kenya, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1321, 1343 (2010) (questioning whether suspected 
pirates receive adequate rights as defendants in Kenyan prosecutions). 
 8 See INT’L MAR. ORG., REPORTS ON ACTS OF PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST 
SHIPS, ANNUAL REPORT – 2011, para. 6, (2012) [hereinafter IMO 2011 PIRACY REPORT], 
available at http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Security/SecDocs/Documents/PiracyReports/180_ 
Annual2011.pdf (citing a worldwide increase of piratical acts from 489 in 2010 to 544 in 
2011, while the number of reported piratical acts near East Africa jumped from 172 in 2010 to 
233 in 2011, an increase of approximately 23%); Raymond Gilpin, Ctr. for Sustainable 
Econs., Counting the Costs of Somali Piracy (U.S. Inst. of Peace, Working Paper, 2009), 
available at http://www.usip.org/publications/counting-the-costs-somali-piracy. 
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rise in piracy have achieved only qualified success.9  By increasing the multi-
national naval presence in the region, for example, the rate of successful 
pirate attacks declined from 63% in 2007, to 21% in 2009.10  Thus far, 
however, the world’s naval forces have failed to pursue or apprehend those 
responsible for piratical activities, “which may not be sufficient to deter 
piracy motivated by outsized financial gains.”11  Arguably, by only 
interrupting the attacks and allowing the criminals to go unpunished, pirates 
are not deterred from committing acts of piracy; they are merely interrupted 
and delayed.12  In fact, the increase in the frequency of attacks in the region 
continues, in spite of the decrease in successful attacks.13  A new approach 
that includes apprehension, prosecution, and incarceration must be 
implemented to meaningfully deter acts of piracy while preserving some 
form of due process. 
The difficulties of designing and implementing such a plan, however, 
continue to frustrate the international community.14  The United Nations 
Convention on the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS) assigns universal jurisdiction 
to the crime of piracy.15  Universal jurisdiction “allows States to arrest 
pirates, seize their ships and cargo, and bring them to trial in the State’s 
domestic judicial system.”16  Despite this broad grant of jurisdictional 
                                                                                                                   
 9 U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Possible Options to Further 
the Aim of Prosecuting and Imprisoning Persons Responsible for Acts of Piracy and Armed 
Robbery at Sea off the Coast of Somalia, Including, in Particular, Options for Creating 
Special Domestic Chambers Possibly with International Components, a Regional Tribunal or 
an International Tribunal and Corresponding Imprisonment Arrangements, Taking into 
Account the Work of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, the Existing 
Practice in Establishing International and Mixed Tribunals, and the Time and Resources 
Necessary to Achieve and Sustain Substantive Results, para. 8, U.N. Doc S/2010/394 (July 26, 
2010) [hereinafter 2010 UN Report]. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Eugene Kontorovich, International Legal Responses to Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, 
ASIL INSIGHTS, Feb. 6, 2009, available at http://www.asil.org/insights090206.cfm. 
 12 See IMO 2011 PIRACY REPORT, supra note 8, para. 6 (noting an increase in piratical 
activity in East Africa and increasing activity in the Arabian Sea resulting from Somali 
pirates’ deployment of motherships). 
 13 According to the statistics quoted above, the success rate of piracy fell 42% between 
2007 and 2009.  2010 UN Report, supra note 9, para. 8.  According to the IMO 2011 Piracy 
Report, however, although the success rate continued to decline, the number of piratical 
attacks in the region actually increased by over 20%.  See IMO 2011 PIRACY REPORT, supra 
note 8, para. 6. 
 14 See Eugene Kontorovich & Steven Art, An Empirical Examination of Universal 
Jurisdiction for Piracy, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 436, 449–51 (2010) (examining the extreme 
difficulty of apprehending, prosecuting, and incarcerating pirates through empirical study). 
 15 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea arts. 100–107, opened for signature Dec. 10, 
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
 16 José Luis Jesus, Foreword, Troubled Waters: Combating Maritime Piracy with the Rule 
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authority, UNCLOS does not require any state to actually take judicial 
action.17  Therefore, the decision to try piracy is left entirely to the arresting 
state.18  As a result of this legal structure and the difficulties involved in 
trying pirates, which will be discussed in greater detail below, many 
countries exercise a catch and release policy, where pirates are simply let go 
rather than apprehended for trial.19  Even countries that choose to apprehend 
and prosecute suspected pirates, such as the United States, France, and the 
Netherlands, face complex legal and administrative challenges that make 
prosecution difficult, if not impossible.20   
The multinational naval forces patrolling near Somalia can now send 
captured pirates to Somalia’s neighbors to stand trial.21  Reports of 
procedural abuse, however, lead observers to question whether these trials 
are fair and in accordance with international law.22  Further, the expense of 
prosecuting Somali pirates weighs heavily on neighboring countries.23   
As these problems illustrate, the current state-centric framework is 
unsustainable.  It creates a disjointed approach that fails to provide 
meaningful deterrence, and therefore fails to solve the problem.  To reverse 
this trend, the international community must better facilitate the 
apprehension, trial, and incarceration of pirates in accordance with 
recognized international principles of fairness and criminal justice.24  The 
                                                                                                                   
of Law, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1213, 1216 (2010) (emphasis added). 
 17 Id. 
 18 See id. (noting that some countries lack an adequate penal code to successfully prosecute 
pirates, while others simply choose to avoid the complicated political problems associated 
with trying foreign nationals in domestic courts). 
 19 See Douglas Guilfoyle, Counter-Piracy Law Enforcement and Human Rights, 59 INT’L & 
COMP. L.Q. 141, 141 (2010) (describing catch and release maneuvers used against Somali 
pirates and the inconsistent effects of the strategy); Kathryn Westcott, Pirates in the Dock, 
BBC NEWS (May 21, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8059345.stm (explaining that a 
Portuguese naval ship released suspected pirates after confiscating their weapons). 
 20 Westcott, supra note 19. 
 21 See Milena Sterio, The Somali Piracy Problem: A Global Puzzle Necessitating a Global 
Solution, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1449, 1477–80, 1486 (2010) (providing examples of regional 
agreements among African, Asian, and Western countries for prosecuting pirates, and 
explaining an attempt by the United Kingdom and Kenya to use a similar system in Somali-
piracy trials). 
 22 See Gathii, supra note 7, at 1343–45 (explaining the unlawful waiting period suspected 
pirates experience between being arrested and charged with a crime in Kenya). 
 23 Kevin J. Kelly, U.S. Seeks to Boost Ties with Breakaway Regions, DAILY NATION (Sept. 25, 
2010), http://www.nation.co.ke/News/world/US-seeks-to-boost-ties-with-breakaway-Somalia-re 
gions-/-/1068/1018158/-/mwdfn5z/-/index.html (reporting that the United States has requested 
Japan’s assistance in helping East African nations defer piracy related costs). 
 24 See generally Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 11, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/217A III (Dec. 10, 1948) (“Everyone charged with a penal offence has the 
right to be presumed innocent . . . in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees 
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efforts taken to lower the pirates’ rate of success are encouraging.  The 
growing number of attacks, however, will continue to drain resources until 
the international community takes steps to bring these criminals to justice.  
Moreover, on the rare occasion when a state actually decides to try a pirate 
under its own, unique judicial system, problems of cohesion and consistency 
arise.25  Thus, this approach frustrates the ultimate goal of fairly and 
effectively handling piracy.  Universal jurisdiction should entail some degree 
of universal rules of process.  Therefore, the international approach to piracy 
must be modified to enable vigorous prosecution of these criminals.  To 
achieve this goal, many scholars argue for including piracy within the 
jurisdiction of existing international courts, such as the International Tribunal 
for the Law of the Sea, which currently has no jurisdiction to hear criminal 
trials.26  While this option is attractive, it may be impracticable in the 
immediate future since multilateral treaties can take years to enact or 
amend.27  As a long-term solution, the United Nations should modify one of 
these international bodies to accommodate piracy.  To provide the necessary 
immediate relief, however, a temporary regional tribunal should be adopted. 
Part II of this Note explores the rise of Somali piracy and the legal tools 
currently in place to apprehend and prosecute pirates.  Part III exposes the 
many flaws inherent in this legal framework in an effort to understand why 
nations often choose not to prosecute apprehended Somali pirates.  Part IV 
analyzes current state practice once a pirate is actually brought to court.  
Part IV ultimately concludes that the current legal framework is ineffective, 
and that an ad hoc criminal tribunal dedicated to piracy is necessary to 
remedy the situation in Somalia.  
                                                                                                                   
necessary for his defence.”); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 9(3), 
Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (“Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be 
brought promptly before a judge . . . and shall be entitled to a trial within a reasonable time or 
to release.”). 
 25 Jesus, supra note 16 (suggesting that the purely jurisdictional framework of international 
law does not produce a reliable approach). 
 26 See, e.g., Yvonne M. Dutton, Bringing Pirates to Justice: A Case for Including Piracy 
Within the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 197, 223–31 
(2010); Craig Thedwall, Note, Choosing the Right Yardarm: Establishing an International 
Court for Piracy, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 501 (2010) (proposing that jurisdiction to hear piracy 
cases be given to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea). 
 27 See Fernando Peinado Alcaraz, Chasing Pirates Is All Very Well—But Who Is Going to 
Lock Them Up?, EL PAÍS, Aug. 17, 2009, at 4, available at http://fernandopeinadoalcaraz.files. 
wordpress.com/2011/09/somalia1.pdf (relating the difficulty involved with ratifying the Rome 
Statute with any potential multilateral treaties regarding piracy). 
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II.  BACKGROUND OF PIRACY AND THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL 
PIRACY LAW 
A.  The Rise of Piracy in Somalia 
Piracy is one of the world’s oldest crimes.28  The Romans confronted the 
unique challenges of piracy by famously calling the ocean’s thieves “hostis 
humani generis,” or enemy of all mankind, arguably establishing the world’s 
first doctrine of universal jurisdiction.29  Despite incredible evolution in 
technology, law enforcement, and international legal theory over the last two 
millennia, groups of individuals continue to exploit the high seas and engage 
in acts of piracy.30  Moreover, in recent years, the number of attacks appears 
to have grown.31  Between 2000 and 2006, approximately 2,400 reports of 
piracy were received, roughly doubling the previous six-year total.32  On 
March 19, 2012, the IMO reported that acts of piracy and armed robbery 
against ships rose 11% over 2010.33  Some analysts even believe these 
statistics underestimate the actual number of pirate attacks, as shipping 
companies fear reporting incidents will result in increased insurance 
premiums and drawn-out investigations.34   
Most of this growth can be traced to the incredible surge of piratical 
activity off the coast of Somalia.35  The region accounts for over half of the 
world’s reported acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea.36  Somali pirates 
operate out of numerous small camps dotting the beaches of the expansive 
Somali coast.37  They use small, fast skiffs to prey upon slow-traveling cargo 
ships,38 and are becoming increasingly sophisticated, using larger “mother 
ships” to extend the range of their operations farther out to sea.39  When 
                                                                                                                   
 28 Dutton, supra note 26, at 203. 
 29 Douglas R. Burgess, Jr., Hostis Humani Generi: Piracy, Terrorism and a New 
International Law, 13 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 293, 301–02 (2006). 
 30 IMO 2011 PIRACY REPORT, supra note 8, at annexes 1–5 (providing a comprehensive 
compilation of all reported acts of piracy or armed robbery at sea in 2011). 
 31 Michael Gagain, Current Development, Neglected Waters: Territorial Maritime Piracy 
and Developing States: Somalia, Nigeria, and Indonesia, 16 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 
169, 170 (2010). 
 32 Id. 
 33 IMO 2011 PIRACY REPORT, supra note 8, para. 5. 
 34 See, e.g., Gagain, supra note 31, at 170 (noting that Australian officials believe the actual 
figure to be 2,000% higher).   
 35 IMO 2011 PIRACY REPORT, supra note 8, para. 6. 
 36 Id. (reporting that East Africa accounted for 223 of the 544 acts of piracy and armed 
robbery against ships in 2011). 
 37 2010 UN Report, supra note 9, para. 7. 
 38 Gilpin, supra note 8, at 8. 
 39 2010 UN Report, supra note 9, para. 7. 
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successful, Somali pirates hijack a ship, guide her to one of several camps 
along Somalia’s eastern shore, and demand a ransom for the crew and 
cargo.40 
Disruption of the global supply chain by Somali pirates causes an 
economic ripple effect throughout the international community.41  For 
example, insurance rates per voyage for ships traveling through the region 
escalated to around $20,000 in 2009, forty times the 2008 rate of $500.42  
Companies that reroute ships around the southern tip of Africa for fear of 
attack, avoid the region completely but add an additional 3,500 miles to their 
shipping routes.43  Although the complex nature of international trade makes 
the increased costs difficult to quantify, these costs have a negative impact 
on the regional, if not global, economy.44  Of even greater concern is the 
physical threat posed to those who travel through the region.  Though the 
pirates’ primary concerns are economic and not necessarily to harm or kill 
civilians,45 pirates reportedly killed seven of the 569 crew members taken 
hostage in 2011.46  Somali pirates also target and disrupt international relief 
programs for the millions of people in war-torn Somalia.47 
Several major factors contribute to the multifaceted and complex problem 
of Somali piracy and are worth brief mention.  First, Somalia’s proximity to 
the Gulf of Aden, a crucial entry point for the Suez Canal, provides easy 
access to one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes.48  Over 20,000 ships 
carrying 12% of the world’s oil supply pass through the gulf annually,49 
providing pirates with a wealth of potential targets.  Second, a successful 
pirate attack can earn millions of dollars for a crew of pirates50 and over 
                                                                                                                   
 40 Kontorovich, supra note 11. 
 41 Ruth Wedgwood, The Law Adrift, AM. INT., Mar.–Apr. 2009, at 123, 124. 
 42 Robert R. Frump, Danger at Sea, SHIPPING DIG., Jan. 12, 2009, at 6, 7. 
 43 Gilpin, supra note 8, at 12. 
 44 See, e.g., id. at 12–13 (noting piracy’s negative regional economic impact in the form of 
declining revenues from tourism, foreign investment and shipping through the Suez Canal); 
Wedgwood, supra note 41, at 123–24 (concluding that the substantial burden caused by piracy 
upon the European and Israeli oil supply and the delivery of Chinese manufactured goods will 
result in increased consumer prices in Europe, Israel, and the United States). 
 45 Jeffrey Gettleman, Pirates Tell Their Side: They Want Only Money, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 
2008, at A6. 
 46 IMO 2011 PIRACY REPORT, supra note 8, para. 8. 
 47 See Mike Mount et al., Pirates Attack U.S. Cargo Ship but Fail to Get Aboard, CNN (Apr. 
14, 2009), http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/04/14/somalia.pirates/index.html#cnnST 
CText (reporting the attempted hijacking of the Liberty Sun, a ship bound for Mombasa, Kenya, 
with food aid). 
 48 James Kraska & Brian Wilson, Fighting Pirates: The Pen and the Sword, 25 WORLD 
POL’Y J., Winter 2008/09, at 41, 41. 
 49 Id.  
 50 See, e.g., Gagain, supra note 31, at 169 (citing the February 5, 2009 $3.2 million ransom 
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$150,000 per pirate by one estimate.51  In a country where around seventy-
5% of households subsist on less than $2 per day, income of this magnitude 
is extremely attractive.52  Moreover, local financiers and government 
officials invest in the pirates’ ventures and reap windfall gains, helping to 
entrench the pirate business model in the Somali economy.53  Finally, as a 
failed state, Somalia’s central government has no judicial system or police 
force, and simply lacks the authority to prevent this type of criminal 
behavior.54  Despite several attempts, Somalia has failed to establish a 
functioning federal government since the Siad Barre regime fell in 1991.55  
The Transnational Federal Government (TFG) took power in 2003, but 
remains largely ineffective.56  In fact, many TFG officials reportedly fund 
and aid piratical activities themselves.57  This confluence of geographic, 
economic, and political factors created the perfect environment for Somali 
pirates, producing “perhaps the most significant eruption of such criminal 
activity in nearly two hundred years.”58 
B.  The International Legal Framework 
Piracy carries with it a unique set of challenges for the modern criminal 
justice regime.  What distinguishes pirates from other, similar criminals is 
that pirates act on a supra-national level, without a true affiliation to any 
state.59  Further, pirates usually operate on the “high seas,” the vast area 
beginning twelve miles off the world’s coasts and belonging both “to all, and 
to no one.”60  As the responsibility to police the high seas falls to no 
particular nation, pirates fall through the cracks as they exploit an 
international community based largely upon the existence of territorial 
                                                                                                                   
payment for the MV Faina, a Ukrainian freighter carrying tanks and small arms).   
 51 Kontorovich, supra note 11. 
 52 Gilpin, supra note 8, at 1. 
 53 Id. at 7 (estimating a financier with just twelve pirates could earn over $321,000 in yearly 
profit). 
 54 Sterio, supra note 21, at 1454–55. 
 55 Gilpin, supra note 8, at 5. 
 56 Id.  
 57 Id. at 6. 
 58 Kontorovich, supra note 11. 
 59 Sterio, supra note 21, at 1460. 
 60 Lawrence Azubuike, International Law Regime Against Piracy, 15 ANN. SURV. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 43, 50 (2009). 
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boundaries.61  The laws addressing piracy, therefore, attempt to address this 
jurisdictional challenge.62 
In response to this centuries-old challenge, the international community 
developed the doctrine of universal jurisdiction,63 which justifies state 
assertion of power over individuals in the broadest possible terms.64  Two 
international treaties authorize countries to apprehend, prosecute, and 
incarcerate pirates under domestic law.65  Excluding the modern limitation 
discussed below, true universal jurisdiction grants this authority regardless of 
the pirate’s nationality or where the crime was committed.66 
At present, UNCLOS codifies the application of universal jurisdiction to 
the crime of piracy.67  The first draft, signed into law in 1958, included eight 
articles concerning piracy.68  The 1982 version of UNCLOS, which applies 
today, also includes these articles.69  A number of nations, including the 
United States, have not ratified UNCLOS.70  However, experts consider the 
treaty a codification of customary international law and therefore binding on 
all states, even non-parties to the convention.71 
The piracy provisions are in Articles 100 through 107 of UNCLOS.72  
Article 100 states the general requirement that all states must “cooperate to 
the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas.”73  
Article 105 grants states the authority to apply universal jurisdiction in order 
to carry out their Article 100 commitments.74  Article 101 contains the 
definition of piracy.  It reads: 
Piracy consists of any of the following acts:   
                                                                                                                   
 61 Sterio, supra note 21, at 1465–66 (noting how discrepancies in national laws often lead 
to under-prosecution). 
 62 Kontorovich, supra note 6, at 251 (explaining that the international definition of piracy 
codifies the concept of universal jurisdiction). 
 63 See Dutton, supra note 26, at 203 (noting piracy is the “oldest crime to which universal 
jurisdiction applies”); Kontorovich, supra note 6, at 244 (arguing that for centuries piracy was 
the only crime to which universal jurisdiction applied). 
 64 Dutton, supra note 26, at 203–04. 
 65 Id. at 204. 
 66 Id. at 203 n.21. 
 67 UNCLOS, supra note 15, arts. 101, 105. 
 68 Milena Sterio, Fighting Piracy in Somalia (and Elsewhere): Why More is Needed, 33 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 372, 385 (2010). 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Azubuike, supra note 60, at 49.    
 72 UNCLOS, supra note 15, arts. 100–107. 
 73 Id. art. 100. 
 74 Id. art. 105. 
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 (a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of 
depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the 
passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: 
  (i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or 
against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; 
  (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place 
outside the jurisdiction of any State; 
 (b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a 
ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate 
ship or aircraft; 
 (c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act 
described in subparagraph (a) or (b).75 
This definition triggers the universal jurisdiction provision in Article 
105.76  Article 101 imposes three requirements for an act to be considered 
piracy in accordance with international law.77  First, the act must be one 
“committed for private ends.”78  This requirement is likely a relic of the days 
when nations would employ pirates under letters of marque.79  UNCLOS 
does not define the term “for private ends”80 and commentators differ as to 
what it means.81  Somali pirates, however, seem to meet this criterion, as 
they appear to be motivated only by the profits from ransom payments.82  
The “private ends” requirement may become a greater issue if Somali pirate 
regimes become affiliated with terrorist organizations that are ostensibly 
motivated by public, social and political change rather than private financial 
gain.83  Regardless, it is likely that clever defense attorneys will claim their 
                                                                                                                   
 75 Id. art. 101. 
 76 Azubuike, supra note 60, at 54. 
 77 Id. at 51. 
 78 UNCLOS, supra note 15, art. 101. 
 79 Michael Bahar, Attaining Optimal Deterrence at Sea: A Legal and Strategic Theory for 
Naval Anti-Piracy Operations, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 12 (2007). 
 80 Azubuike, supra note 60, at 52. 
 81 Douglas Guilfoyle, Piracy off Somalia: UN Security Council Resolution 1816 and IMO 
Regional Counter-Piracy Efforts, 57 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 690, 693 (2008) (explaining the 
differences between a narrow interpretation of this requirement, which excludes politically 
motivated violence at sea such as acts of terrorism, and a broad interpretation, which holds 
that the term excludes only public acts of violence at sea, such as those committed by civil 
war insurgents). 
 82 Guilfoyle, supra note 19, at 143 (noting that depicting themselves as purely after 
financial gain is in the pirate’s best interest, as ransoms may not be payable to a terrorist or 
other politically motivated organization).  
 83 U.N. SCOR, 65th Sess., 6390th mtg. at 13, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6390 (Sept. 27, 2010) 
[hereinafter SCOR Report]. 
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clients acted for public or political ends, creating a further obstacle for the 
application of UNCLOS’ definition to suspected pirates.84 
The second requirement is the geographic limitation that piracy must take 
place “on the high seas.”85  The geographic limitation in Article 101 applies 
to both the definition of the offense (proscriptive jurisdiction) and the 
parameters of a state’s enforcement authority (enforcement jurisdiction).86  
According to UNCLOS, piracy can only be committed, and therefore 
suppressed, outside of the realm of any other nation’s jurisdiction.87  This 
requirement upholds notions of state sovereignty by allowing states to 
monitor their own territorial waters without international interference.88  For 
failed states such as Somalia, however, where authorities are either unable or 
unwilling to police their own territorial seas, a crack develops in the 
international regime to prevent piracy.89  As Somalia illustrates, a national 
piracy problem can quickly become an international piracy problem.90 
Finally, for an act of violence at sea to fall under the Article 101 
definition of piracy, it must be committed by the passengers of one ship 
“against another ship.”91  Suspected cases of piracy in the Gulf of Aden 
usually meet this requirement, as the attacks involve two ships far off-
shore.92  
Arguably, UNCLOS’s biggest drawback is that it neither requires nor 
regulates state participation in the enforcement of its piracy provisions.93  It 
merely provides a definition of piracy.94  Though Article 100 of UNCLOS 
calls for states to “cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of 
piracy on the high seas,”95 no mechanism compels states to meet this duty.96  
Even though UNCLOS represents international custom with regard to piracy, 
states must first incorporate its provisions into their domestic criminal law to 
successfully prosecute a pirate in their domestic judicial systems.97  
                                                                                                                   
 84 Dutton, supra note 26, at 207–08. 
 85 UNCLOS, supra note 15, art. 101.  
 86 Guilfoyle, supra note 19, at 144. 
 87 Id.  
 88 Azubuike, supra note 60, at 51. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Sterio, supra note 21 (suggesting that Somali piracy has become a global problem). 
 91 UNCLOS, supra note 15, art. 101. 
 92 Dutton, supra note 26, at 207. 
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However, few states have taken this crucial step since UNCLOS came into 
force.98  Accordingly, piracy laws vary greatly between countries, creating a 
confusing lack of cohesion that undermines Article 100’s mandate to repress 
piracy.99  The specific problems that arise, and how they affect the criminal 
justice process will be discussed in more detail in part III.  
Some nations also rely on the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA 
Convention) to justify detention and prosecution of suspected pirates.100  
Unlike UNCLOS, the SUA Convention only binds member parties, as it is 
not considered customary international law.101  The purpose of the SUA 
Convention is to address the perceived gaps in UNCLOS.102  For example, 
the SUA Convention covers politically motivated acts of violence against 
ships, a crime not addressed by UNCLOS.103  Further, the SUA Convention 
requires a state to either extradite or prosecute an offender, using stronger, 
more specific language than UNCLOS.104  Despite these differences, most 
nations remain reluctant to rely on the SUA Convention to justify detention 
and prosecution of pirates.105  Some experts suggest that confusion regarding 
the Convention’s applicability leads countries to believe the Convention is 
only applicable to acts committed by terrorists.106  In other words, the SUA 
Convention covers ship hijackings that are politically, not financially, 
motivated.107 
Finally, to combat the recent rise in Somali piracy the United Nations 
issued a series of ad hoc measures in the form of Security Council 
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resolutions.108  In June 2008, the Security Council called for states to 
“cooperate in determining jurisdiction, and in the investigation and 
prosecution of persons responsible for acts of piracy and armed robbery off 
the coast of Somalia.”109  The same resolution further authorized certain 
nations that attained consent from the Transitional Federal Government of 
Somalia to enter Somalia’s territorial waters and use “all necessary means to 
repress acts of piracy and armed robbery.”110  Resolution 1851, passed 
unanimously in December of 2008, calls for increased international 
coordination and even broader military action to fight piracy, authorizing 
land-based operations in Somalia.111  Thus far, the international response to 
these resolutions has been positive.112  The United States created an 
international Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, which now 
consists of over fifty member states and international organizations.113  
Moreover, in December 2008, the European Union established operation 
ATALANTA, an ongoing military operation designed to contribute to the 
“deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery 
off the Somali coast.”114  These cooperative missions reduced the percentage 
of successful pirate attacks in the region.115  
III.  PROBLEMS PROSECUTING PIRACY UNDER THE CURRENT 
INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK 
Despite the overwhelming amount of international attention and resources 
aimed at fixing the Somali piracy problem, remarkably few pirates ever see 
the inside of a courtroom.116  A recent empirical study performed by 
respected international maritime law scholar Eugene Kontorovich found 
“that of all clear cases of piracy punishable under universal jurisdiction, 
international prosecution occurred in no more than 1.47 percent” of those 
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cases.117  Further, as demonstrated by the Said case in the United States, the 
difficulties continue even after suspects are brought to court.118  The very few 
Somalis who are detained and prosecuted face a complex, disjointed legal 
framework, where their rights and protections vary dramatically depending 
on which country makes the arrest.119  This section explores the practical and 
legal obstacles that contribute to these trends. 
A.  The Cost of Prosecuting Piracy 
Perhaps the most obvious explanation as to why so many states are 
reluctant to prosecute piracy revolves around economics.120  From a cost-
benefit perspective, prosecuting piracy is hard to justify on a national 
level.121  First, a state faces the expense of policing the world’s oceans, a 
costly venture in terms of both labor and equipment.122  Second, after 
assuming this initial cost, states that capture suspected pirates must begin the 
process of preparing for trial.123  This process usually entails collecting 
evidence, transporting witnesses, and providing translation services.124  For 
Western nations thousands of miles from the crime scene, these obstacles are 
particularly expensive.125  Finally, prosecuting nations must be prepared to 
incarcerate suspected pirates in domestic prisons.126  States are typically 
reluctant to assume the weight of these enormous costs if they have no 
compelling interest to do so.127  For example, a ship traveling the Gulf of 
Aden may be registered under a Danish flag, owned by a British company, 
insured by an American corporation, and staffed with a predominantly 
Filipino crew, all while transporting Saudi oil.128  If attacked by Somali 
pirates in international waters, the loss is spread between these state 
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parties.129  Although several nations are victims of the pirate attack, no state 
suffers compelling enough losses to take on the expensive task of 
independently prosecuting pirates.130  Simply put, the costs associated with a 
difficult international prosecution can sometimes outweigh the marginal loss 
absorbed by each one of these separately affected nations.131  As the 
international legal framework provides neither a rule of priority nor a rule of 
obligation between these nations, which country shoulders the burden of 
prosecution is often a “political, not a legal issue.”132   
Consequently, Western nations are often reluctant to carry the heavy 
burden of prosecution absent compelling national motives.133  The chief 
prosecutor in Hamburg, Germany, recently stated, “the German judicial 
system cannot, and should not, act as World Police.  Active prosecution 
measures will only be initiated if the German State has a particular, well-
defined interest . . . .”134  Similarly, in May 2009, Spain released seven 
suspected Somali pirates because officials believed the crime had too little 
relation to Spain to warrant prosecution.135  Even states that are direct 
victims of an attack often seek to avoid the expensive burden of prosecuting 
pirates, as demonstrated by the common practice of simply paying a ransom 
in return for hijacked ships, cargo, and crew.136  From the perspective of 
Western nations currently policing the Gulf of Aden, it is far more cost-
effective to simply release suspected pirates on the beaches of Somalia than 
to make an arrest.137  Any effective change in the legal framework of piracy, 
therefore, must address the costs that accompany piracy prosecutions.  
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B. Confusion over a Pirate’s Legal Status 
Historically, a pirate’s legal status was somewhere between combatant 
and criminal, carrying the “disabilities of both” but the “privileges and 
immunities” of neither.138  Countries could capture pirates and prosecute 
them, although they could not do the same to regular combatants.139  
Alternatively, countries could attack and kill pirates without a trial, whereas 
they would have to provide a trial to a criminal.140  For better or worse, 
modern nations no longer have the same choices.141  As Eugene Kontorovich 
notes, the advent and development of human rights law now “precludes the 
classic and most obvious antipiracy measure: killing them.”142  Moreover, 
UNCLOS requires pirates to be prosecuted under a nation’s civilian criminal 
justice system, as opposed to a specialized judicial body.143  
Beyond merely prohibiting the killing of pirates without a trial, the 
modern body of international humanitarian law presents obstacles that 
further dissuade countries from prosecuting acts of piracy.144  Perhaps chief 
among these concerns is whether a detained Somali pirate can be classified 
as a refugee, and therefore privileged to asylum under a number of human 
rights conventions.145  Asylum may be required if a pirate shows he would 
face an unfair trial, torture, or extrajudicial killing if repatriated to Somalia, a 
predominantly lawless nation lacking a strong federal government.146  In 
responding to Somali piracy, Britain encouraged its ships not to arrest pirates 
for fear of this exact possibility.147  Britain’s concern is that, if successful in 
claiming refugee status under European Union human rights law, a Somali 
pirate may be authorized to stay in Britain indefinitely.148  As Britain 
apparently realized, this possibility increases the cost of arresting pirates, 
while providing a reward to the pirates themselves.149  For the captured 
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pirate, remaining in a Western nation, such as Britain, could be viewed as a 
reward.150  Britain, however, would be stuck with the question of what to do 
with the refuge pirates.151 
Another concern stemming from an ambiguous legal status is whether 
pirates classify as enemy combatants, and therefore deserve prisoner of war 
(POW) status under the Third Geneva Convention.152  Though the treaty was 
designed with large, well-organized armies in mind, pirates may be able to 
successfully claim POW status under Article 4(a)(2) of the convention, 
which recognizes “other militias,” “volunteer corps,” and “organized 
resistance movements” as enemy combatants provided they meet certain 
conditions.153  If entitled to POW status under Article 4(a)(2), pirates would 
enjoy Geneva Convention protections until their final repatriation154 at the 
termination of the armed conflict, an occurrence that could be difficult to 
define in the case of Somali piracy.155  While a pirate’s status as a POW 
would not prevent prosecution under municipal law, Article 4(a)(2) 
articulates a specific set of rules affecting his treatment by the detaining 
power156 and would invite international input into the domestic procedure.157  
These added burdens could delay prosecution and increase the costs of 
detention, further deterring states from apprehending the pirates at all.158 
Although scholars disagree over the applicability of the Third Geneva 
Convention to Somali piracy159 and no nation currently recognizes Somali 
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piracy as an “organized resistance movement,”160 the ambiguity surrounding 
a pirate’s POW status presents another potentially expensive legal question 
for capturing states.161  In situations of uncertainty, Article 5 stipulates that a 
person shall enjoy POW status “until such time as their status has been 
determined by a competent tribunal.”162  At the very least, therefore, a pirate 
may be entitled to a hearing in front of a competent tribunal regardless of 
whether he perfectly fits into one of the Third Geneva Convention’s 
categories.163  If a captured pirate invokes this right and thus halts civilian 
criminal proceedings, the prosecuting state will incur further drains on 
judicial resources as it litigates this question.164  
A pirate’s ambiguous legal status presents a controversial political 
question as well.  After declaring that Article 4(a)(2) did not apply to al 
Qaeda, the second Bush Administration faced severe international 
criticism.165  Arguably, Somali pirates meet the Article 4(a)(2) requirements 
even better than al Qaeda, as the pirates treat captured crew reasonably, 
thereby satisfying Article 4(a)(2)’s requirement that the militia abide by the 
laws and customs of war.166  In fear of international backlash, therefore, 
nations may be reluctant to declare Somali pirates beyond the scope of the 
Third Geneva Convention.167 
Further confusing the matter, a suspected Somali pirate’s ambiguous legal 
status poses yet another complicated question: what rights should a captured 
pirate have?168  Even those who argue that pirates are “not enemy prisoners 
of war” acknowledge that they should receive some “Geneva Conventions 
treatment” while remaining eligible for domestic, civilian prosecution.169  
Under the international legal framework, however, states often have different 
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answers to this question, assuming they have answered it at all.170  If not 
protected by the Third Geneva Convention, for example, pirates arrested by 
the United States may not even have basic criminal protections against illegal 
searches and seizures, warrantless arrests, and indefinite detentions.171  In 
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, the Supreme Court of the United States 
found no indication that the Framers intended the Fourth Amendment “to 
apply to activities of the United States directed against aliens in foreign 
territory or in international waters.”172  Accordingly, in January 2006, the 
United States detained ten suspected Somali pirates for eight days without 
probable cause determinations, charges, or a trial,173 long past the forty-eight 
hour limit required for arrests without a warrant.174 
Similar procedural complications exist for other countries involved in the 
fight against Somali piracy.  For parties to the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR), Article 5(3) ensures a right to a prompt hearing in 
front of a judicial authority.175  While the ECHR jurisprudence on this 
Article indicates that materially unavoidable delays do not violate the 
convention, states must comply with a complex set of legal requirements to 
justify detaining and prosecuting a suspected criminal.176  Notably, both the 
European Union and NATO, two of the international organizations that 
command and coordinate anti-piracy operations, are not parties to the 
ECHR.177  Thus, if an ECHR signatory captures a pirate while under the 
command and strategic control of these international bodies, the ECHR may 
not apply.178  In this event, prosecuting nations must rely on other sources, 
such as international custom or domestic criminal process to determine how 
to treat detainees.179 
Ultimately, this international confusion marginalizes the rights of 
suspected Somali pirates.  If a country is not dissuaded from arresting a 
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suspected pirate altogether, the suspected pirate faces a murky and disjointed 
set of procedural protections after capture, which vary depending on the 
arresting nation or organization.180  Even those countries making the arrests 
are unsure exactly what protections should be granted to their detainees.181  
Further, with little or no conception of modern criminal justice, suspected 
pirates usually fail to understand even the most basic procedural 
protections.182  
Any legitimate and effective reform of the regime to fight and prosecute 
piracy must therefore include a comprehensive definition of a pirate’s legal 
status and criminal rights.  In May 2009, for example, the Russian Navy held 
twenty-nine suspected pirates aboard one of its warships for three weeks 
while determining whether to prosecute.183  A clearly articulated legal status 
would be advantageous to both the pirate and the arresting state.  A concrete 
definition would help prevent excessively long detention periods and 
mitigate apprehensions on whether to prosecute for arresting nations.   
C.  The Intersection of Domestic and International Law 
As discussed above, UNCLOS provides states with broad international 
authority to capture and prosecute pirates.184  A pirate’s arrest and 
prosecution, however, must also be carried out in accordance with the 
arresting state’s domestic laws.185  The resulting relationship between 
national and international law is not always seamless.186  
Since UNCLOS came into existence, few states have incorporated its full 
effect into their domestic criminal statutes.187  Many nations, for example, 
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have no law against maritime piracy at all.188  Where nations do outlaw 
maritime piracy, the statutes are not uniform and contain limitations not 
included in UNCLOS.189  Rather than codify true universal jurisdiction, for 
instance, some nations criminalize piracy only when a sufficient connection 
exists between the arresting state and the crime,190 such as an attack on 
nationals191 or an attack perpetrated within territorial waters.192  Moreover, 
domestic laws rarely define acts of piracy as broadly as international law, 
excluding preparatory acts such as incitement, support, or voluntary 
participation, which are included in UNCLOS.193  As many domestic laws 
are not coextensive with UNCLOS, circumstances often arise where a nation 
may have the international jurisdiction to prosecute yet lack the domestic 
authority to do so.194 
Further complicating the matter, some states have not taken the basic 
steps necessary to implement their UNCLOS responsibilities.  Implicit in the 
international framework is the notion that states will arrest suspected 
pirates.195  However, some countries, such as Germany, refuse to grant their 
navies the authority to make criminal arrests.196  In the Gulf of Aden, where 
military ships are engaged in massive patrolling efforts, this type of domestic 
law leaves Germany incapable of arresting and fully repressing piracy 
according to its UNCLOS responsibilities.197  These discrepancies between 
international and national law help explain why so few states prosecute 
Somali piracy.198  Without domestic authority, any grant of international 
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jurisdiction to arrest and prosecute suspected piracy, no matter how broad, is 
essentially a dead letter. 
D.  Evidentiary Issues 
One of the most basic impediments to achieving successful prosecution is 
finding and presenting evidence sufficient to convict a suspected pirate.199  
Once captured, pirates often profess to be innocent fishermen, a plausible 
claim considering many pirates are fishermen by trade.200  Further, the 
possession of weapons does not distinguish pirates from innocent seafarers in 
the region who also frequently carry weapons.201  To convict a pirate, 
therefore, prosecutors must present persuasive evidence beyond merely 
where a suspect was found and what weapons he carried.  However, this can 
be a difficult task considering the nature of the alleged offense.202  Pirate 
attacks often occur 1,000 nautical miles off the coast of Somalia.203  If the 
pirates do not throw any incriminating evidence into the sea when a naval 
ship approaches,204 the military personnel making the arrest are usually 
untrained in preserving and collecting evidence and do not always follow 
proper procedure required by civilian courts.205  Therefore, gathering and 
transporting the defendants, witnesses, weapons, and other evidence 
necessary for a judicial procedure is often prohibitively difficult.206 
This problem presents yet another dilemma.  On the one hand, the 
difficulty of meeting evidentiary burdens dissuades countries from 
prosecuting pirates.207  Rear Admiral William D. Baumgartner, Commander 
of the Seventh Coast Guard District, recently suggested that one of the main 
deterrents to states is the “significant legal and logistical challenges” in 
transporting pirates, evidence and witnesses to appear in criminal courts 
thousands of miles away.208  Returning to the historical summary justice 
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approach to piracy, however, is simply no longer a feasible option.209  Pirates 
must receive a set of basic evidentiary and due process protections.210  Any 
solution to piracy must therefore walk the fine line between these competing 
interests, reducing the evidentiary burden to prosecute and convict a pirate 
while maintaining basic criminal rights. 
IV.  SOLUTIONS 
This global failure to prosecute piracy calls attention to a systematic 
problem.  The chosen means of enforcing the law matches neither the nature 
of the crime nor the criminal who commits it.  Certainly, a legal system is 
broken when it effectively deters states from enforcing the law and 
simultaneously rewards criminals that break it.  States seem to be adapting, 
however, and demonstrate an increasing willingness to stretch the legal 
framework.  Though encouraging, current state practice is ultimately 
insufficient.  Further steps are necessary to install a successful anti-piracy 
regime. 
A.  Current State Practice 
Despite the setbacks described above, nations throughout the world 
recently increased their efforts to prosecute Somali piracy.211  Currently, 
piracy trials occur in one of three ways.  Usually, pirates apprehended by 
Western nations are transferred to a regional state, such as Kenya, for 
prosecution.212  Alternatively, in 2010, Western nations such as the United 
States, the Netherlands, and France, commenced domestic piracy trials.213  
Finally, the TFG and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 
recently began efforts to prosecute pirates in the Puntland and Somaliland 
regions of Somalia.214  Though encouraging, these approaches do not alone 
provide a sustainable and complete solution to the Somali piracy problem.215 
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Transferring suspected pirates to a regional state, usually Kenya, remains 
the most common practice for prosecuting Somali pirates under the theory of 
universal jurisdiction.216  Indeed, between 1998 and 2009 over 76% of 
universal jurisdiction piracy trials occurred in Kenya, “all but four of 
them.”217  For nations struggling to justify the financial, political, and legal 
risks of prosecuting pirates at home, Kenyan courts offer a convenient 
solution.218  In 2008 and 2009, Kenya signed a Memorandum of 
Understandings (MOUs) with the United States, and similar agreements with 
Britain, the European Union, Denmark, Canada, and China, agreeing to 
prosecute suspected pirates in exchange for financial support.219  Pursuant to 
these agreements, Kenya tried at least ten pirates of the more than 100 
alleged pirates the country was host to.220   
Despite preliminary success, this arrangement has placed a significant 
burden on Kenya’s already overburdened criminal justice systems.221  Kenya 
has a 870,000 case backlog, with only three prosecutors in the Mombasa 
office of the Department of Public Prosecutors.222  Further, Kenya currently 
incarcerates around 53,000 prisoners, despite a national capacity to 
incarcerate of only 16,000.223  As a result of this overburdened criminal 
justice system, reports accuse Kenya of holding suspected pirates for months 
without trial or access to adequate healthcare.224  Reports also indicate that 
the Kenyan government “does not provide [pirates] with defense attorneys” 
in certain situations.225  If true, these conditions violate many of the basic 
protections guaranteed by the International Convention on Civil and Political 
Rights.226  Convention violations aside, in September 2010 the weight of the 
world’s piracy problem became too much for Kenya to bear.227  Facing a 
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staggering lack of judicial resources, Kenya canceled the MOUs despite 
significant pressure from the international community.228  Thus capturing 
nations may no longer rely on Kenya as a forum for prosecuting Somali 
pirates. 
During 2010, perhaps the most encouraging development yet occurred in 
the fight against Somali piracy.  Several Western nations using the power of 
universal jurisdiction began piracy trials in their own domestic courts.229  To 
date, the United States, the Netherlands, Germany and France have even 
convicted Somali pirates.230  While this unprecedented willingness to 
prosecute pirates suggests progress, a reminder of the infrequency of these 
domestic prosecutions must accompany any discussion of this trend.  
Although over thirty nations deploy ships to the Somali region,231 only a 
handful of these countries attempted a domestic prosecution.232  In the rare 
instance an apprehending nation does try a pirate in their domestic court 
rather than simply letting the pirate go or outsource prosecution to a regional 
country, obstacles inherent in the legal framework make prosecution legally 
difficult, controversial, and “potentially embarrassing for the forum state.”233  
For several reasons, these domestic prosecutions do not appear to be an 
ultimate solution. 
First, some question whether detention and conviction in a Western 
nation actually deters the pirates.234  One suspected (now convicted) pirate 
held in the Netherlands reportedly enjoyed “the comfort of a TV and a toilet 
in his cell,” novel amenities to a Somali pirate.235  The pirate preferred the 
relative luxury and safety of imprisonment in the Netherlands to his life in 
Somalia and planned to have his family join him after serving his 
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sentence.236  Holding pirates in Western prisons, therefore, may inadvertently 
reward rather than punish their piratical conduct.237 
Second, for Western, democratic nations, the decision to prosecute 
Somali pirates is often political rather than legal.  For example, many Dutch 
politicians have argued against further piracy prosecutions, fearing an 
expensive and unpopular legal battle over repatriation of the Somali 
nationals.238  If citizens consider such prosecutions expensive or 
controversial, democratic nations may be less likely to prosecute Somali 
pirates on the level necessary to eradicate the problem. 
Third, these domestic prosecutions present basic legal difficulties as 
domestic judges strive to interpret and apply international law.239  Many 
states outlaw piracy according to “the law of nations,” apparently 
incorporating the international definition of piracy into domestic criminal 
law.240  Criminal prosecution under such language, however, can be 
difficult.241  The U.S. piracy statute provides an example.  Originally enacted 
in 1819, this statute does not specifically identify what constitutes “piracy as 
defined by the law of nations.”242  Rather, the statute leaves it to the court to 
surmise the international definition of piracy and apply it, a task that 
domestic judges may be ill-suited to perform without expertise in the field of 
international law.243 
Confusion surrounding the application of this statute led to an interesting 
legal conflict in the United States.  In the summer of 2010, two Somali 
piracy cases began before different judges in the Federal Court for the 
Eastern District of Virginia, situated in Norfolk.244  In August 2010, Judge 
Raymond A. Jackson dismissed the piracy charges in the first case.245  Judge 
Jackson held that the United States piracy statute must be limited to the 
definition of piracy at the time of the law’s enactment.246  Citing the statute’s 
only judicial interpretation, an 1820 Supreme Court decision by Justice 
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Joseph Story, Judge Jackson found that an attack must be successful to 
constitute piracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1651.247  Since the attack in question was 
unsuccessful, the men could not be held liable for piracy under U.S. law.248 
Jackson received strong criticism from the international legal community 
for refusing to adopt the modern UNCLOS definition of piracy.249  Citing the 
“fair warning requirement,” which bars punishment for conduct a defendant 
“could not reasonably understand to be proscribed,”250 Jackson defined 
piracy according to the statute’s original 1819 interpretation.251  Scholars 
contend, however, that this approach demonstrates a “deep hesitancy to 
weave the ephemeral strands of customary international law — state practice, 
international organization pronouncements, professorial writings — into 
something as solid as handcuffs.”252  Judge Jackson gives only secondary 
weight to two widely ratified treaties that contain modern definitions of 
piracy, including the 1958 High Seas Convention that the Senate ratified.253 
Less than three months later, Virginia Judge Mark S. Davis took a 
different approach.  The case in front of Judge Davis involved an 
unsuccessful piracy attempt on the frigate USS Nicholas.254  In defining 
piracy, Davis turned to Sosa v. Alvarez Machain, in which the Supreme 
Court confirmed federal judicial authority to “recognize (but not create) new 
causes of action based on the ‘present day law of nations.’ ”255  Thus, 
whereas Judge Jackson applied the static law of 1819, Davis decided that the 
“ ‘law of nations’ connotes a changing body of law, and that the definition of 
piracy in 18 U.S.C. § 1651 must therefore be assessed according to the 
international consensus of the definition at the time of the alleged 
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offense.”256  Judge Davis found such consensus in the 1982 UNCLOS 
definition, which includes attempted piracy.257  Unlike the Said case, the 
unsuccessful attack on the USS Nicholas could therefore proceed to trial.258 
This example illustrates how administering international law on a 
domestic scale can produce incongruous results.  That two judges in the same 
country, let alone the same courthouse, may reach opposite conclusions 
reveals the difficulty of interpreting and applying international anti-piracy 
laws on a domestic level.  As courts around the world take on this difficult 
task, wildly different results could occur as states apply various doctrines of 
statutory and constitutional interpretation.259  Accordingly, discrepancies in 
enforcement will likely persist, further frustrating international attempts to 
uniformly deter piracy through domestic prosecution. 
Finally, the most recent development in the fight against Somali piracy 
involves prosecutions in the Puntland and Somaliland regions of Somalia.260  
With the help of various United Nations programs and other regional 
partners, Somalia has arrested and convicted a number of pirates within its 
own boarders.261  Though encouraging, reports indicate these prosecutions 
require “significant further assistance” to meet “international standards.”262  
Necessary funding for this project, however, has been difficult to secure.263  
Donors lack confidence due to the “fractured nature of the law on piracy 
within Somalia” and the “issues concerning Somali judicial and prosecutorial 
capacity.”264  Without adequate funding or judicial resources, Somalia is not 
an immediate or sustainable venue for piracy prosecutions. 
Ultimately, deterring Somali piracy using the current legal framework 
presents an insurmountable challenge for the international community.265  
Even after the substantial efforts to prosecute pirates both in Western and 
regional nations, studies show no impact on the rate of pirate attacks.266  In 
November 2010, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs B. Lynn 
Pascoe reported that “[t]he menace of piracy off the coast of Somalia was 
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outpacing international efforts to stem it.”267  As this statement seems to 
acknowledge, recent efforts to deter Somali piracy have fallen short of 
providing the urgent, sustainable, and effective solution necessary for its 
eradication.268  Hampered by inherent financial, logistical, and legal 
problems, the current legal framework should be replaced. 
B.  Navigating a Way Forward 
To escape the current legal quagmire, nations must address this 
international problem on an international level.  To that end, advocates of a 
global solution propose including piracy in a new or currently existing 
international tribunal.269  Immediate implementation of such a solution, 
though, seems unlikely.270  In a July 2010 report, the United Nations found 
including piracy within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court or 
the International Tribunal on the Laws of the Sea not to be “feasible.”271  
Hope for an international solution, however, need not be lost.  Instead, the 
United Nations should establish a temporary, regional piracy tribunal under 
its Chapter VII authority.  This approach would provide immediate relief and 
create momentum toward a more permanent solution. 
Historically, the Security Council uses ad hoc criminal tribunals to 
address unique problems with the administration of criminal justice.272  Of 
course, the Security Council may only exercise Chapter VII authority in the 
event of a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.”273  
Once this threshold is met, the Security Council may take certain measures to 
“restore international peace and security,” including the establishment of an 
ad hoc criminal tribunal.274  The situation here appears to meet this 
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preliminary requirement,275 as existing Security Council resolutions find 
Somalia to constitute such a threat and piracy to exacerbate the problem.276  
The Security Council, in other words, seems to possess the necessary 
authority to immediately create such an ad hoc tribunal.   
Equipped with the proper authority, the Security Council could begin the 
actual process of creating a piracy tribunal.  In May 1993, the Security 
Council established the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) by passing resolution 827.277  This resolution approved 
the ICTY’s constitutive statute and addressed several logistical matters, such 
as location, competence, and organization.278  Creation of the piracy tribunal 
would likely occur in much the same way, with a draft statute addressing 
these logistical matters presented to the Security Council for a vote. 
Perhaps the greatest logistical question surrounding the proposed piracy 
tribunal involves its location.  For several reasons, the most advantageous 
location for the piracy tribunal is within or near Somali territory.  Proximity 
to Somalia and the Gulf of Aden would ease efforts to transfer apprehended 
suspects, collect evidence, and sequester witnesses in preparation for trial.279  
Apprehending nations would no longer suffer the burden of conducting trial 
in a courtroom several thousand miles from the scene of the crime, and 
defendants would no longer be hauled across the globe, away from their 
families, to stand trial.  An ad hoc criminal tribunal in the region would also 
eliminate concerns regarding a pirate’s legal status, as countries would not 
bear the risk of captured pirates claiming combatant or refugee privileges. 
Further, the presence of an international judicial body within Somalia will 
help the TFG rebuild their broken and ineffective criminal justice system.280  
One of the great accomplishments of the ICTY was to strengthen the rule and 
power of law within a war-torn Yugoslavia.281  To this end, the international 
piracy tribunal will provide jobs for citizens and resources for lawmakers and 
jurists.282  A functioning judiciary could also engender societal respect for 
                                                                                                                   
Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) (“[T]he establishment of the International Tribunal falls squarely 
within the powers of the Security Council under Article 41.”). 
 275 2010 UN Report, supra note 9, para. 97. 
 276 S.C. Res. 1897, supra note 109. 
 277 S.C. Res. 827, para. 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993). 
 278 Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for 
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the 
Former Yugoslavia since 1991, U.N. Doc. S/25704 at 36, annex (1993) and S/25704/Add.1 
(1993), adopted by Security Council on 25 May 1993, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993). 
 279 See generally 2010 UN Report, supra note 9, para. 98. 
 280 See Gilpin, supra note 8, at 11 (noting the deterioration of law and order in Somalia). 
 281 Assessing the Legacy of the ICTY – Background Paper, INT’L CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR THE 
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (Feb. 23–24, 2010), available at http://www.icty.org/sid/10292. 
 282 See generally About the ICTY, INT’L CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, http:// 
2012] YOU’RE A CROOK CAPTAIN HOOK! 745 
 
 
the law, demonstrating to criminals the legal consequences of their actions.283  
Placing the piracy tribunal in Somalia, therefore, serves two strategic ends—
an effective and immediate stride to eradicate piracy, and much needed 
international support for the Somali government.  
Also in this initial stage, the jurisdictional competency of the piracy 
tribunal must be considered.  To define what acts the tribunal may punish, 
the Security Council should start by adopting the definition of piracy 
codified in UNCLOS article 101.284  This article, however, pertains only to 
attacks on the high seas.285  Therefore, to create the most effective tribunal 
possible, the Security Council must expand the body’s jurisdiction beyond 
the substantive and geographic limitations of UNCLOS.  For example, the 
tribunal should have jurisdiction over the organization and financing of 
piracy.  With jurisdiction over these activities, the tribunal could reach the 
financiers behind Somali piracy and substantially disrupt their business 
model.  To that same end, the tribunal should extend jurisdiction to cover 
acts occurring within Somali territory.  With this authority, the piracy 
tribunal could prosecute all participants of piracy, no matter where they seek 
refuge. 
The Security Council must also address the related issue of concurrent 
jurisdiction.  Pursuant to UNCLOS, all nations have authority to prosecute 
the pirates they capture on the high seas.286  If a piracy tribunal is created, 
both the tribunal and the apprehending nation could conceivably claim 
jurisdiction over the same captured Somali pirate.  The Security Council 
must therefore create a mechanism for determining which entity has primacy.  
In these circumstances, nations should retain the authority to prosecute 
suspected pirates only when they are given the consent of the piracy tribunal.  
Further, the tribunal should grant consent if a state demonstrates a 
compelling interest to try the pirate in domestic court.  Such compelling 
interests should be decided by the court on a case-by-case basis, with 
decisions subject to review by the Security Council.  Giving priority to the 
piracy tribunal encourages nations to take advantage of the tribunal.  In turn, 
regular use could help ensure steady financial support from the international 
community.  This system is also flexible, providing states a conditional 
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ability to domestically prosecute suspected pirates in special circumstances.  
Moreover, such a strategy ensures that the majority of captured pirates face 
the same internationally regulated and monitored judicial and detention 
system. 
During this planning stage, the Security Council must also determine 
exactly how to structure the judicial body.  The piracy tribunal should consist 
of at least two separate judicial bodies; a trial court and an appellate court.  
The tribunal would also require a prosecutor’s office.  To ensure judicial 
competency, these bodies should be staffed with judges and lawyers who are 
highly specialized in matters of international maritime law.  The judges 
should be nominated and then elected by the members of the General 
Assembly.  This process would ensure that all nations have an input, as all 
nations are in some way affected by the crime of piracy.  Prosecuting 
attorneys, however, should be appointed by the Security Council.  This 
separate process for selecting and appointing judges and lawyers would help 
maintain an independent bench.  Moreover, exclusive control over 
prosecutors would allow the Security Council to retain a degree of input over 
how aggressively suspected pirates are prosecuted.  Requiring the 
prosecutor’s office to submit an annual report for the Security Council’s 
review could further enhance this control.  Finally, the Security Council may 
also wish to establish some type of legal aid office for defendants who 
cannot afford legal representation.  Most importantly, these positions should 
be heavily weighted with individuals from the region.  Preference for East 
African judges and counselors would create a tribunal familiar with the area 
and sympathetic to its unique problems. 
Notably, the ad hoc piracy tribunal must be temporary, as Chapter VII 
powers may be invoked only to “maintain or restore international peace.”287  
Accordingly, the tribunal would eventually require a completion and residual 
strategy.288  As demonstrated by precedent, however, a detailed strategy 
might not be a prerequisite to bringing the piracy tribunal to life.289  When 
establishing the ICTY in 1993, the Security Council stipulated no exact 
completion date or strategy.290  Ten years later, the tribunal’s judges 
compiled a plan to complete their work, which was later endorsed by 
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Security Council resolutions.291  Taking a similar stance with regard to the 
piracy tribunal would allow the Security Council to consider many different 
influences and contingencies for ending the piracy tribunal, a topic that is 
beyond the scope of this Note. 
Those who oppose the creation of a piracy tribunal often cite the 
anticipated cost of such a body as support for their argument.292  Indeed, a 
new judicial mechanism would require substantial resources such as new 
facilities, judges, lawyers, and other staff.293  Even the United Nations 
recognizes an ad hoc tribunal as an expensive option, noting that other 
judicial mechanisms “have ranged from around $14.3 million (the East 
Timor Special Panels for a biennium) to $376.2 million (ICTY for a 
biennium).”294   
However, certain unique characteristics of the piracy problem could help 
facilitate financing for the tribunal.  First, piracy burdens maritime security 
on a global scale, and not just for those nations located within the Somali 
region.  A piracy tribunal, therefore, benefits all nations, distinguishing it 
from other ad hoc tribunals that provide judicial relief only to specific 
geographic areas.  This fact could lead to reliable financial participation 
because nations will expect to directly profit from their investment in the 
form of maritime security.  Second, under the current system nations that 
choose to prosecute Somali pirates must shoulder the entire cost alone.  
Thus, while costly to the United Nations as a collective entity, an ad hoc 
tribunal would be cost-efficient to each of its separate members, who would 
share the cost equitably.  The collective result, reliable piracy deterrence, 
would be far greater than the individual cost to any one nation.  Finally, the 
Security Council could also solicit funding from the shipping industry.  As 
the group most directly victimized by piracy, shipping companies could be 
willing to contribute to the costs of prosecuting and imprisoning those 
responsible.  As these factors indicate, the tribunal’s cost could be spread 
amongst a number of international entities, producing a more efficient and 
effective means of piracy deterrence than the current system. 
Finally, implementation of an ad hoc piracy tribunal would have 
important consequences for the future of piracy law.  The current state-
centered legal framework relies on mutual participation, cooperation, and 
coordination by all states to suppress maritime piracy.  Like a chain that is 
only as strong as its weakest link, however, the system unravels when a 
failed state such as Somalia has neither the resources nor the will to prevent 
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pirates from seeking refuge within its territory.  Despite massive 
international attention, for example, piracy reached record levels in 2010 for 
the fourth straight year.295  To say the least, the current legal framework is 
broken.   
An ad hoc piracy tribunal, however, could be an important first step 
toward fixing the framework.  The temporary criminal courts in Rwanda and 
Yugoslavia, for instance, played crucial roles in catalyzing support for the 
International Criminal Court.296  A temporary piracy tribunal could have a 
similar effect on the international community, exposing both the positive and 
negative aspects of an international forum for trying suspected pirates.  
Further, a temporary piracy tribunal under the Security Council will allow 
for a degree of judicial experimentation.  Noting the evidentiary difficulties 
of proving “that armed men in a boat on the high seas are pirates,” Eugene 
Kontorovich recently suggested adopting “equipment articles” that “create a 
judicial presumption of guilt on piracy charges for the crews of civilian 
vessels possessing certain specified equipment within a certain defined area 
of the high seas.”297  Though the merits of such a strategy are debatable, a 
piracy tribunal provides the United Nations with the latitude to develop these 
types of creative approaches.  
To remedy this situation, the Security Council should chart a new legal 
course for combating Somali pirates and convene an ad hoc criminal 
tribunal.  This action could finally restore peace to the Gulf of Aden and 
prevent the number of pirate attacks from increasing yet again in 2012.   
V.  CONCLUSION 
Despite pouring unprecedented amounts of global attention and resources 
into the Gulf of Aden, pirates continue to defy their captors by increasing the 
frequency and range of their attacks.  With minimal resources and training, 
these modern buccaneers disrupt global shipping lanes, block international 
aid deliveries, and frustrate the world’s foremost naval powers.  The 
international community can no longer afford to watch the shipping industry 
suffer while money is funneled into the lawless society of Somalia, possibly 
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even filling the pockets of terrorists.  Piracy is a global menace that must be 
stopped with strong and effective legal action. 
As it stands today, however, the international community confronts 
Somali piracy with a broken system.  The regime, predicated on universal 
jurisdiction, gives authority to those states willing to prosecute but leaves the 
decisions of whether and how to prosecute entirely to the apprehending 
nation.  This structure ignores the unique nature of piracy, which 
distinguishes it from other international crimes.  Pirates are supra-national 
actors with nebulous legal standing that injure the entire global community, 
rather than individual national actors.  Accordingly, prosecution is legally 
complex and expensive.  Transporting evidence and witnesses to a courtroom 
thousands of miles away can be financially and logistically impossible.  
Absent strong compulsion, therefore, nations typically elect not to shoulder 
the entire legal, fiscal, and political cost of trying a Somali pirate in a court 
of law. 
Despite the inadequacy of the current system, encouraging signs of 
change have begun to emerge over the past few years.  Regional countries 
and apprehending nations have shown a growing interest in bringing pirates 
to justice and deterring piratical activity.  Looking beyond the auspicious 
beginnings of domestic prosecution, however, the eventual limitations of 
domestic piracy trials are clear.  Prosecutions in Kenya and other regional 
nations raise potential legal and humanitarian problems, as apprehending 
nations transfer suspected pirates to countries without the legal or judicial 
capacity to handle the criminals.  Meanwhile, trials in Western nations may 
lack a true deterrent quality under the circumstances.  Further, African and 
Western nations alike must confront a confusing integration of domestic and 
international law. 
To fix the Somali piracy problem, the international community must 
abandon this limited, state-centric approach.  While a long-term solution may 
be the establishment of some type of permanent international tribunal, an ad 
hoc judicial mechanism could prove to be the perfect short-term option.  
Given a flexible, immediate option, the Security Council could reduce the 
Somali piracy problem now and begin to restore order to one of the world’s 
most important shipping lanes. 
